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PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN IN THE
FRAMING OF TAX LAWS.
The problem of suitable and just taxation is one which is
forever demanding solution , but never solved . Adam Smith
gave to the world certain rules which should govern in taxa
tion , the first of which was that “ The subjects of every state
ought to contribute towards the support of the government
as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abili
ties — that is , in proportion to the revenue which they
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state .”
While most writers on political economy have been disposed
to accept this as a sound and just rule , some have objected
to it that it puts out of view the fact that government pro
tects persons as well as property , and that, if the burdens of
government should be proportional to what is protected by
it, then persons should be taxed , not only in respect to the
revenue they enjoy , but also , regardless of revenue , in return
for the protection they receive as persons . This is plausi
ble , but the practical difficulties in its application are numer
ous . One of these is the impossibility of estimating the
comparative value o
f protection to one ' s person and to his
property . Given $ 10 ,000 to be collected as taxes from a
hundred persons , one -half o
f
whom receive an aggregate
revenue o
f
$ 100 ,000 , while the others have no revenue at
a
ll ; shall we say that the life and liberty of a man shall be
set over against an income o
f
$ 1 ,000 , so that ,while taxing
the income 5 per cent . , the poll -tax shall be $ 50 ? Such
a rating would be perfectly arbitrary , because elements o
f
comparison are entirely wanting ; but ,while we should prob
ably agree that the relative rating o
f protection to the per
son was ridiculously low a
s compared with the rating o
f
property , we should probably also agree that it would be
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impossible to collect such poll- taxes from persons who had
no taxable incomes . Again , when the value of protection
to the person is in question , some writers insist that this is
greatest to those who are physically or mentally -weak and
feeble , and who, in the absence of government , would be
least able to protect themselves ; and , consequently ,must be
come the prey of the more vigorous and strong , and prob
ably fall into a condition of slavery . The proportionate tax ,
say these writers, would , consequently , be largest upon the
weak and feeble.
But is there any sufficient reason for attempting to meas
ure taxation by the value of government ? If govern
ment were something to be taken up or dispensed with at the
option of individuals , thatmethod of estimation would take
on a different appearance ; but ,when the existence of a gov
ernment in some form is confessedly something always to
be assumed , it is clear that there can be no basis for an esti
mate of its value as compared with that condition o
f things
in which there should be no government at all . It is true
that , if a theory valuable for practical application can be de
duced from any imaginary state o
f things , there is no reason
in the baselessness o
f
the assumed facts to preclude our
availing ourselves o
f
it . The theory that government is
founded in contract may answer a good purpose , though his
torically it is baseless . But , so long as it is impossible to es
timate the relative value o
f
government to person and prop
erty , and impossible to collect taxes according to it if the
estimate were practicable , it is manifest that any theory of




society under settled government with an imaginary state
o
f things when no government exists must be absolutely







f government , because human experience
always finds one in existence . Itmay also assume that gov
ernment is an absolute necessity , and is in some form to be
perpetuated , whether al
l
those who are under it
s protection
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do or do not assist in supporting it . The question is not be
tween supporting government and dispensing with it, but it
is how ,and in what proportions, we shall contribute to the
support of government , having no alternative but to support
it . It is further to be assumed that the business of govern
ment will always be to protect all that is embraced within ,
those comprehensive terms — life, liberty , and property .
If, now , we begin our discussion with these preliminaries
conceded , shall we not find that the cost of protection as
sumes more prominence than the value of protection ? As,
in any event, we are to have a government , and must support
it, if we find it costs as much to protect one man who has a
property of $ 100 ,000 as it does to protect a hundred who
have nothing , is it not just that the one should pay asmuch
tax as the hundred ? Now , the experience of governments is
that the possession of wealth does peculiarly expose persons
to the attacks of lawlessness , so that, if the wealthy man shall
pay only the same poll-tax with the poor man , he will by no
means contribute in proportion to what the protection of his
person costs the government . To make taxation propor
tional as between the rich man and the poorman , the former
should not only be taxed for his property , but should pay a
heavier poll-tax also .
But the cost of protection cannot, anymore than the value
of protection , be the basis for a levy of taxes , for the
conclusive reason , if there were no other , that any attempt
thus to tax would find a large proportion of the community
unable to bear the burden , and what they cannot bear must
be borne by the others . This may seem a hardship to those
who must pay , but the hardship is only apparent ; and , when





this assertion is demonstrated a
s follows : The value
o
f government to any man is proportioned to the complete
ness o
f
the protection it extends to al
l
men ; if it undertook
to protect only those who could contribute to its cost , it
would thereby breed lawlessness and invite anarchy . A tax
payer is , consequently , contributing fo
r
his own protection
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those who are unable to
pay for themselves . Moreover , as government is essential
to him , and without it he could be secure in nothing , he will
always receive in it
s protection something o
f
more value
than that which h
e
has parted with a
s
taxes . Under such
circumstances , if others receive valuable protection fo
r
which




complaint on his part against the gov
ernment , which , in giving him an indispensable protection ,
requires him to d
o what is indispensable to render the gov
ernment able to give it . If government apportions the cost
o
f
its own support among the people with such regard to
equality of contribution a
s
the circumstances appear to
admit o
f , it performs its whole duty . There is a necessity






The point here finds an illustration in the case o
f military
duty . The performance of this sometimes becomes indis
pensable to the support o
f
the government , and in great
emergencies the whole power o
f
the state may possibly be





military power embraces a
ll
able -bodied male persons
between the ages o
f eighteen and forty -five , o
r say sixteen
and fifty , each one of these may be required to perform
equal service fo
r
the state , though one ,being wealthy ,has
vastly more at stake when the state is in peril than another
who is poor . But a general levy embraces only a part o
f




the other , though the classes not
embraced have as much a
t
stake a
s the classes who are .
The reason fo
r
demanding the service o
f
one class to the
exemption o
f
the others is that that class alone is really
competent to perform it ; and though , as between the person
summoned and the person not summoned , inequality and
injustice seem to b
e present , yet , as between the former and
the government , neither the one nor the other is discover




citizens , and the state must demand it of those who are
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capable of performing it . As al
l
are interested in the
defence o
f




s protection , the citizen who is required to perform
a service which puts even his life at peril is still only defend
in
g
his own interests , though , at the same time , and as a part
o
f
this self -defence , he defends the political society of which
he is a member . The questions which are presented , when
a law prescribing military service is to be determined upon ,
are , therefore , only questions o
f
State policy , and must be




the general good .
In this regard the case is the same with laws fo
r
taxation .
We shall admit the desirability , if it were practicable , o
f
the state apportioning taxes according either to the value
o
f protection or to the cost of protection ; but , as either is
wholly out o
f
the question , nothing remains but for the gov
ernment to provide for the collection o
f
its revenues by such
rule or rules a
s will operate best for the general interest .
These rules must be practical — that is to say , they must be
such as can be enforced without serious mischief , and such
a
swill produce the revenue . But ,when the question is what
is and what is not practical , apparent fairness and equality as
between individuals are o
f
the highest importance ; and to
the common mind no rule seems to bemore just and fair than
that persons should be taxed for the support o
f government
in proportion to the revenue they enjoy under its protection .
Such a rule combines the idea o
f
the value of government
with that o
f
ability to bear the burden ; it seems to be as
just and fair as any that is capable of enforcement , and , as it
approves itself to the common mind , it seems to be one
which public policy and the best interests o
f
the State can
justify and sanction .
In this country , taxation is by the state and also by the
Federal government . To arrive at just results , the one gov
ernment in making its levies must takenotice o
f
what is done
by the other , and so frame its own laws as to make the action
o
f
the two conduce to an equality in the distribution o
f
the
burden as near asmay b
e practicable . The general govern
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ment in its levies has hitherto made them in ways quite
distinct from those adopted in the states , and its action may
in brief be indicated as follows :
1 . It has for the most part derived its revenues from indi
rect taxes , instead of direct taxes .
2 . So far as these were internal taxes , they have been
made to bear most heavily upon articles o
f luxury .
3 . So far as they were levied upon imports , they have been
laid most heavily upon such manufactured articles as come




r they have in other ways discriminated with a view to fos
ter , protect , or aid the industries o
f
our own land . And
sometimes the duties have purposely been made prohibitory .
As indirect taxes are collected eventually of consumers ,





life , instead o
f bearing any proportion to the rev
enue which citizens respectively enjoy under the government ,
fall most heavily upon the poorer classes . Duties , for in
stance , on the imported cloths which are generally worn , go
to increase the prices o
f
those cloths , and of such others as
are made use of for the same purposes ; and , though the
wealthy classes will buy and use of these much more than
the poorer classes , in proportion to their numbers , yet , in
proportion to their revenue , the advantage is vastly in their
favor . The tax o
f
2
0 per cent . or so which the man of
$ 100 ,000 income pays upon the foreign cloths consumed
in his family is , in the aggregate , to him an insignificant item ;
while , to the thousand poor men whose aggregate incomes
are n
o larger , the amount is not only vastly greater in its
total , but to each individual is often exceedingly oppressive .
We thus perceive that in the case of these indirect taxes the
rule that taxes should be laid in proportion to revenue fails
in enforcement , and that , as between the wealthy and the
non -wealthy classes , the latter are prejudiced .
S
o
far as indirect taxes discriminate against luxuries , they
may be said to keep in view the rule or maxim referred to ,
for it is but reasonable to presume that people will purchase
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luxuries in some proportion to their actual current receipts
over and above what is required to supply their actual needs .
And ,while this will never be exactly true , yet, as those who
purchase luxuries will in the purchase tax themselves , being
under no compulsion to purchase at a
ll , such taxes , on the
score o
f equality , are open to less objection than any others .
Especially is this the case when the articles taxed are not
only to b
e
considered and classed a
s
luxuries , but are , also ,
a
s
in the case o
f intoxicating drinks ,deleterious to an extent
that renders it proper and politic to discourage their con
sumption . The heavier the tax the less relatively , it may be






In respect to discrimination in duties in order to protect
and foster domestic industry , it is to be said that the reason
for the discrimination can have nothing to do with the duties
bearing most heavily upon the poorer classes . Of the policy
o
f protective duties , nothing will be said in this paper , as it
has n
o necessary bearing o
n
the present discussion . When ,







a legitimate exercise o
f
the power




f producing a revenue for the needs of government is em
ployed for somewholly different purpose , and no revenue is
expected o
r
desired from the employment , it is misused , and
themisuse is usurpation . We say nothing here o
f
what the
governmentmay do under it
s power over commerce ; doubt
less itmay prohibit importations the effect of which would
b
e
deleterious ; but ,when a pretence ismade of taxing with
out any purpose to produce a revenue , this is a plain abuse
o
f governmental power .
The Federal government has sometimes levied a tax on
incomes . If there were no inherent difficulties in the levy
and collection o
f
such a tax , it would answer most perfectly
o
f any that could be devised the requirements o
f
equality
and justice . Exempting to every man from his income suf
ficient for the reasonable needs o
f
himself and his family ,
and calling for a proportionate contribution in respect to the
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remainder only , such a tax would , in theory , be levied ac
cording to the revenue (net income ) which each man enjoys
under the protection of the government . In England it has
not been found very difficult to levy and collect such a tax ;
but in this country it has disappointed the expectations of
those who favored it , and become odious , and the objections
to it are so serious that it seems improbable it will ever be
resorted to as a permanent means of revenue . Some of the
difficulties are the following :
1. An income tax cannot be enforced without minute en
quiry into every man 's affairs. In this regard the difficulties
are found to bemuch greater in this country than in most
others , because in older countries society is more steady and
fixed ; the people change their locality , their pursuits , and
their business relations less frequently ; and sources of in
come and probable returns are more open to public inspec
tion . In most other countries , also , the supervision by the
public authorities of private life and private business ismore
constant ,minute, and particular than the ideas of our own
people would tolerate ; and the traditions of our people — who
remember the general warrants of the last century , and who
trace their liberties through resistance to inquisitorial inspec
tion of private affairs and domiciliary visits of officials — are
all such as to set them instinctively and firmly in opposition
to themeasures necessary to obtain the information on which
the tax must be levied .
2. This necessary information is to be obtained , if at all,
either by requiring every man to furnish it under oath or by
demanding and inspecting his books and papers , and supple
menting any knowledge thereby obtained by such enquiries
and investigations among those acquainted with the business ,
or assuming to be so , as might be supposed likely to throw
light upon the income derived therefrom . To compel the
person himself to furnish the information ,would be to put
before him a temptation to fraud and perjury , which many
will never resist. A feeling of hostility to the law , a repug
nance to the public disclosure of the secrets of one's busi
ness, a conviction that the truth is not generally given in
FRAMING OF TAX LAWS . II
. .
these statements , and that, therefore , to be honest is to be
unequally and unjustly taxed , al
l
combine with natural cupid
it
y
to induce the tax -payer to conceal whatever he thinks
is not likely to be discovered , and to take oaths which he
quiets his conscience in taking by assuming that he is only
doing what is done b
y
others generally . Thus the tax de
moralizes the community . The moral right o
f
the govern
ment to place such temptations before its citizens can only
be justified on a clear conviction that it is demanded b
y
a
necessity that cannot reasonably be met by any less injurious
expedient .
3 . The power to inspect books and papers for any purpose
is one peculiarly susceptible to monstrous abuses , and may
easily be employed for dishonest private purposes . This has
often been demonstrated , not only under the late law for the
collection o
f
income taxes ,but also in connection with the re
covery o
f
duties on imports . Spies and informers , in this
country , seem to be natural and inevitable incidents of any
system which permits it , and business men instinctively re
sent the uncovering o
f
their business affairs to strangers ,who
may o
r may not have the public interest in view , as Wat




child ' s nakedness . It
is idle to say , as some political economists do , that people
ought to be willing to disclose their incomes freely , and be
taxed upon them ; for , even if there were no special reasons
for secrecy , such a willingness could only exist in association
with a belief that the disclosure was being obtained solely on
public grounds ,and that others were making the like . More
over , often there are reasons for privacy in business matters
which are o
f
thehighest importance to business success . The
general result is that , while an income tax may reach and
gather it
s
contributions from salaries , o
r
from those whose
business operations are simple and open to general observa
tion , it will be evaded where business ismore extensive and
complicated , and where incomes are largest . It thus , in
proportion , falls heaviest on those who are least able to pay .
4 . An income tax can reach only the incomes in money or
it
s equivalent . Investments the results of which are ex
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pected to be realized only at a future day — like investments .
in wild lands or in city lots —may increase in value largely ,
but the increase cannot be taxed as income . It has been
suggested that the increase mightbe annually valued for this
purpose , but the practical difficulties would be insuperable ,
and the injustice would occasionally bemade so apparent as
to seem monstrous . Thus : a city lot in one of our large
cities is , perhaps , worth less in market to -day than it was in
May , 1868 , but from that date , fo
r
si
x years , it was steadily




n this increase , would have paid on that which
he never realized ; on a capital which , instead o
f being pro
ductive , has been continuously a drain , in taxes and other
wise , upon his resources . No such method of estimating
income could b
e just , unless it took into account decrease in
value as well a
s
increase , and to allow for this would obvi
ously be impracticable .
But the objections to an income tax are such that it seems
safe to predict that , though it may be resorted to in emer
gencies , o
r
what seem to be such , it will never constitute a
permanent source o
f
revenue in this country . It can never
in it
s operations b
e just or satisfactory , and , therefore , cannot
long be retained .
The Federal government levies some taxes on instruments
o
f
business and commerce . Where these operate as direct
taxes , and are judiciously laid , they are as little objection
able a
s any that can be devised . But themost of such taxes





fall , finally , on the consumer . The check stamps for which
the manufacturer o
f
tobacco pays , like the stamps he puts
upon his packages ,will be taken into account by him in fix
ing the price o
f
his merchandise , and the consumer will pay
fo
r
them . Whatever has been said regarding indirect taxes
will apply to most stamp duties .
If Federal taxation bears most heavily on the poorer
classes , state taxation ought to aim at relieving the ine
quality .
The states have been accustomed to collect taxes on em
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ployments , on corporate franchises , on corporate business or
profits , and on property . Some other state taxes have been
levied , but the receipts from them have not been great . The
taxes on employments have not generally constituted a large
source of income, and , where they have been levied in the
shape of license fees, their operation has almost necessarily
been unequal. Indeed , they cannot well be otherwise unless
they are levied on a calculation of income. A license fee of
$50 collected indiscriminately of physicians may to one be
oppressive , while another ,whose business is much larger and
more lucrative ,would scarcely feel it . A large brewer might
be benefited by the tax which would close the establishment
of his neighbor whose business was comparatively insignifi
cant . The Michigan tax upon dealers in liquors has closed
up a large number of establishments , but almost or quite in
variably those the business of which was small . Discrimina
tions are sometimes made in the effort to equalize the burden ;
as, the city of Richmond , in Virginia , discriminated in her tax
upon lawyers , grading them for taxation in several classes ;
but at best this can only palliate and lessen the inequalities.
There is no hardship — though there is sometimes inequal
it
y
— in the taxation o
f corporate franchises when they exist
a
s special privileges , and those privileges are accepted with
knowledge that they may b
e
thus burdened . When , how
ever , corporations exist under general laws which present
equal opportunities fo
r
all to organize , it is difficult to under
stand what special privilege there is to tax ; especially , if the
corporate business is something in which copartnerships o
r
individuals may compete , a tax on a corporation which the
copartnership o
r
individual in the same business is exempt
from would bemanifestly unequal and unjust . It is difficult ,
for instance , to understand how a special tax on a newspaper
corporation could b
e just when the corporation must , in addi
tion , pay al
l
the taxes on it
s property and business which are
levied on the owners o
f
a rival establishment which is not
incorporated .
The chief resort o
f
the states , however , has always been a
tax o
n property assessed according to valuation . T
o make
this just and equal it has been thought necessary to tax both
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real and personal property , and to include in the latter the
interests of individuals in corporations , and their moneys and
credits of every sort , irrespective of the locality of the prop
erty or corporation , or of the residence of the debtor in case
of credits . From the aggregate of credits , however , the tax
payer has generally been permitted to deduct the indebted
ness , if any, owing by himself, though a similar deduction
from tangible property or interests in corporations has not
usually been allowed . The state tax systemshave been full
of incongruities and inequalities , one of which is above indi
cated , namely , that he whose property is invested in credits
is taxed only on the surplus above his indebtedness ,while the
land -owner , though perhaps owing for all he owns, and , there




has nominal ownership . In many ways dupli
cate taxation takes place : the poorman who has bought a
homestead on credit must be taxed upon its value , while the
vendor is taxed on the price agreed to be paid for it ; the




shares ,which represent his interest in the corporate property ,
while the corporation , as an artificial person , is taxed on the
value o
f
the same property ; and so on . Some of these ine
qualities the statutes sometimes endeavor to provide against ;
a
s , for instance , in the case o
f corporate shares , b
y exempt
ing them from taxation when the corporation itself is taxed ;
but in some other cases the difficulties are such as cannot be
overcome . The case of the taxation ofmortgages while the
property mortgaged is also taxed is an illustration ; it has
been proposed in some quarters that this should b
e
avoided
by deducting from the valuation o
f
lands the amount of any
lien upon it , and , theoretically , this seems just and practi
cable . But one difficulty such a plan would encounter would
b
e
found in the temptation it would present to the placing o
f
fictitious liens upon property , as screens against taxation . A
further impediment to the success o
f
such a plan will be
alluded to further on .
Every man who has observed the operation of state taxa




ll . Some of these are so troublesome
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and embarrassing that many thoughtful persons doubt the
expediency of continuing it . A few will bementioned :
1. Some of these are the same in kind , though not in de
gree , with those which are encountered in assessing income.
Valuation is to be made of household furniture , stock in
trade, shares in corporations , credits of every sort,and , indeed ,
of every species of legal interest which , under the arbitrary
classification of the law , is not considered real estate . Un
der the fiction of law that personalty always accompanies




taxed in Ohio , if the owner is
domiciled there , though situated in Arizona or in India .




assessor can have no personal knowledge whatever , and in
the main h
emust rely upon the owner for information . The
opportunity to escape taxation by fraud and deception will ,
therefore , concur with the temptation , and open dealing with
the assessor is not to be looked for . Experience demon
strates that putting the tax -payer under oath aids but little in
obtaining a just listing o
f
his personal property , and in some
states , by connivance o
f
the assessor , the vast majority of al
l
this property escapes assessment . Of course the man of




many securities , is much less likely to be fully
taxed than the man o
f
small means , invested in some one
place o
r
in some single security .
2 . A custom of under -valuation , long followed , leads
even those who insist that all property shall be taxed to look
upon personalty as comparatively unimportant ; and it is no





those they assess , they are ac
customed to take little account o
f personalty as compared
with their assessment o
f
lands . Assessors who are sworn to
put a cash valuation upon a
ll property habitually disregard
their oath , and particularly in the case o
f personalty make
little attempt towards an assessment that shall be either ab
solutely o
r relatively just .
The disregard o
f
law in this particular produces some cu
rious results . Referring to the assessments for 1870 it will
be found that Connecticut was the only state in which the
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valuation of personalty exceeded that of real property . The
assessment of personal property in Indiana was $69,000 ,000
greater than in Illinois ; that in Ohio was greater than in New
York , nearly twice as great as in Pennsylvania , and almost
ten times as great as Michigan ; and that in Massachusetts
was greater than that in New York and Pennsylvania com
bined . It is true this statement would be somewhat mis
leading if it were not added that there are differences in the
exemptions from taxation in the different states ; but it will
nevertheless enable us to appreciate someof the anomalies
of practical taxation , and to understand the corrupting ten
dency of a system under which assessors openly ,notoriously ,
and shamelessly disregard their duty in assessment .
3. While thus personalty is under-valued , as compared with
lands , allowance cannot be made in taxing lands for the liens
upon them . To illustrate :
John Doe, in Toledo , gives a mortgage on his lands to a
neighbor. While the latter owns it the assessor in Toledo
will be likely to know about it and to tax it , but he will tax
it only as a part of the mortgagee 's personalty , under-esti
mating, as is customary , the aggregate , so that land and mort
gage together will be assessed much below what the land by
itself would be.
But themortgagee may assign it to some one domiciled in
another state , in which case it cannot be taxed in Ohio at al
l
,
because , in law , the locality of a debt is the domicile of the
owner . But suppose he assigns it to some one in Cincin
nati ; is it not vastly more probable that themortgageor in
Toledo will apprise his assessor of the existence o
f
themort
gage in order to obtain the deduction in assessment , than
that the assignee in Cincinnati will notify his assessor in order
that he may perform his duty in paying taxes upon it ? In
deed , the only practical method o
f taxing the mortgage to
the exemption o
f
the land would seem to be to tax it against
the debtor , and allow him to deduct the amount , when paid ,
from his debt . But it is very doubtful if in dealing with his




the difficulties of taxing personal property ,
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and of its demoralizing methods , no wonder the question is
sometimes asked , Why tax it at all ? Most people would
answer a
t
once that justice to the owners o
f
real property
demands it ; to exempt the money -lender from taxation on
his securities ,while the former is taxed on his lands , seems
not only rank injustice , but a serious discouragement to the
investment o
fmoneys in productive industry . True , itmay
be urged that a probable result of exempting moneys and
securities from taxation , while farming lands are still taxed ,
would be to invite capitalists to put out their money in loans
to escape the taxes , and that thismust bring down the rates
o
f
interest , while the additional cost o
f farming caused by
the increased tax o
n




f agricultural products , so that probably neither would
the money -lender gain nor the farmer lose by the change .
But this is suggesting an operation in economic law which
only experience and observation can verify , and by vast
numbers o
f persons the suggestion will be received with
incredulity . Besides , this meets only one of the apparent
inequalities resulting from the exemption o
f personalty ; the
laborer , taxed on his homestead from which he produces
nothing for the market , will require further explanations .
The political economist may make such a
s will satisfy his
own mind , but it is quite another thing to satisfy those who
have never made a study o
f
economic laws .
We shall venture upon the attempt here to indicate the
requisites o
f
a good tax law .
1 . The law , in selecting the objects of taxation , should
prefer those which afford the least opportunity for conceal
ment , evasion , and fraud ; and , al
l
other things being equal ,
should choose those which are so fa
r
exposed to public







oaths before the assessor
can make his list .
2 . The objects chosen should be such that the tax levied





the community generally , and so near as may
b
e
in proportion to their respective incomes . The fewer the
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objects of taxation the better , provided the proper result is
reached , because the less will be the difficulty , annoyance ,
and expense of assessment and collection .
3. If a single tax would fall upon a few only , it should
be supplemented by such as will relieve this injustice , and
the effect of any one tax , or of a tax on any one object,
should be considered only in it
s general bearing as a part o
f
the general levy of taxes by the state .
4 . A tax law should not only as nearly as possible be just ,
but it should present to the common mind n
o appearance o
f
injustice . In drafting it , it is to be remembered that to most
men a tax seems to be a burden on theman from whom the
collector receives it , even when the educated mind is able to
perceive that the payer himself is the real collector , and is
reimbursed in his payment b
y
his customers . And in this
fact may be discovered the importance o
f avoiding exemp
tions which might appear unjust , whether in fact they are
so o
r
not . The use made at this time , in inflaming the pub
lic discontent , of the fact that government securities are not
taxed ought to be to the country a valuable lesson . It may
be true that the public save more in interest by making the
bonds untaxable than they lose in taxes ; but great numbers
o
f people do not look beyond the exemption , but dwell
upon that as governmental favoritism to the money -lender ,
and suffer their passions to become inflamed and incite
them to wild and dangerous action . If , therefore , we are
asked whether the burdens o
f
taxation would not be more
equally distributed if moneys and credits were expressly
exempted from taxation than they are now when moneys
and credits are properly taxed , but , in reality , taxed in small
parts only — the question seems to be pertinent ; but on a
moment ' s reflection we perceive that it only uncovers





There are people who contend that governments , like
churches , should be supported b
y
voluntary contributions
exclusively ; and in the ideal republic perhaps the needs o
f
government may b
e provided for b
y
the voluntary offerings
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of patriotic citizens who vi
e
with each other in contributing
in proportion to their ability . But in the ideal republic we
may assume that every citizen will be wise in public affairs ,
and that , while his patriotism will keep his selfishness in strict
subordination and incline him to do what is best , his intelli
gence will never leave him in doubt what the best is . With
u
s
discussions must concern actual and practical govern
ments ,made by and for people of limited intelligence , with
whom the principle o
f
selfishness is always active and pow
erful . The system o
f
taxation that is relevant to such dis
cussions is the system that can be worked , and not that which
ideally is perfect . Now , no system can be worked , or even
once put into temporary successful operation , which does
not appear to call for a fair proportion o
f
the public burdens
from the accumulations o
f
the wealthy classes . And as in









such securities will not be tolerated unless




Stocks in corporations which have a practical monopoly in
their line form excellent subjects for taxation , provided the
tax is levied wisely and fairly , and al
l
the conditions are fa
vorable to operating justly . Suppose , for example , that al
l
the railroads in Ohio were required to pay into the state
treasury i mill for every mile they carried a ton of freight ,
and 1 - 2 cent fo
r
every mile they carried a passenger , and
that this payment should constitute the sole collection o
f
taxes by the state ; what theoretical injustice would there be
in this ? As everybody makes use of the railroads — the peo
ple possessing o
r controlling largemeansmost ofall — and as
the taxes would only g
o
to swell the railroad charges , which
the general public would pay , it is manifest that the burden
would b
ewell distributed . But in attempting to enforce such
a scheme the difficulties would be insurmountable . First ,
if the tax increased railroad charges to the like amount ,
the people would clearly perceive that , after all , the tax was
extracted from their own pockets , and not from accumulated
railroad wealth . But , second , if the railroads of one state
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were taxed thus heavily , they would be taxed into bank
ruptcy unless the competing lines in other states were taxed
to the same extent ; for, as they must keep their prices
down to those charged by their competitors , it would not be
possible for them to collect from freight and passengers a tax
which their competitors do not pay , and , consequently , they
must bear the burden themselves , and to the extent of the
tax are placed at a disadvantage in competition . And this
question of competition enters into every plan for imposing
exceptional taxation upon corporate stocks . A state cannot
afford to tax the chief enterprises of her people out of
existence ; she must tax in proportion as they are taxed
elsewhere .
In our opinion the most prominent evils in state taxation
at the present time are to be found in the habitual under
valuation of property , and the neglect to assess at all a large
proportion of all personalty . We have not the time to
enumerate and explain these , but they include the habitual
taking of false oaths by assessors, the connivance at and
encouragement of these by the public, the fixing of arbitrary
standards by the assessors, and the departure from these
when there are friends to favor or obnoxious business or
classes to punish , and the strengthening and encouragement
of a sentiment among the people that in matters of taxation
there are no such things as public obligations or publicmorals .
Why should manufacturers or officials be honest in the taxa
tion of liquors , when neither the public nor officials are
expected to be honest in ordinary state and municipal taxa
tion ? There is an evil here of sufficient vitality and per
sistence to employ the best efforts of reformers fo
r
many
years to come . '
* Note . — The foregoing paper wasprepared fo
r , and read before , the Amer
ican Social Science Association , at it
s meeting in Cincinnati on April 22 ,
1878 . It is not , as will be seen , a discussion of legal questions , but of ques
tions in political economy . Still , a
t
this time , when attention is very generally
being directed to the principles o
f
taxation , it will be found not wanting in
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